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Products Liability in the Digital Age:
Online Platforms as “Cheapest Cost Avoiders”
CATHERINE M. SHARKEY†
Products liability in the digital age entails reckoning with the transformative shift
away from in-person purchases at brick-and-mortar stores to digital purchases
from e-commerce platforms. The epochal rise of the online storefront has vastly
expanded the prevalence of direct-to-consumer sales, implicating complex
questions of how liability rules should respond when those consumers are harmed
by the products they buy, especially in this age of international e-commerce and
cross-border sales.
Imposing liability on online platforms on grounds of their superior ability to
prevent harms from newly emergent risks, i.e., their status as “cheapest cost
avoiders,” reveals courts’ efforts to vindicate the regulatory needs of society, and
hence pin responsibility on entities in the best position to have readily avoided
harm arising from the imposition of excessive risks. Products liability is a
microcosm of how the common law evolves over time, specifically, here, to
respond to new societal risks—posed by the automobile, mass-produced goods,
and now, digital e-commerce. At each juncture in the development of products
liability law, judges have relied explicitly on deterrence, or prevention of harm,
rationales to address new forms of risks and prevent them from materializing into
harms, and in doing so, have recognized new harms and/or expanded tort
liability.

† Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy, New York University School of Law. I am
grateful to Mark Geistfeld for helpful comments. Zach Garrett (NYU 2023) provided extraordinary research
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Judge John Wiley of the California Court of Appeals provocatively
described Loomis,1 in which Amazon was held strictly liable for burn injuries
caused by a hoverboard listed on its online platform that burst into flames, as a
case that “beautifully illustrates the deep structure of modern tort law: a judicial
quest to minimize the social costs of accidents—that is, the sum of the cost of
accidents and the cost of avoiding accidents.”2 Seizing on the online platform’s
name, Judge Wiley insisted that “Amazon can control its river . . . . [by]
undertak[ing] cost-effective steps to minimize accidents from defective products
sold on its website” and that “[s]trict tort liability will underline the priority
Amazon places on its safety efforts.”3 Elaborating further on this Calabresian
analysis of Amazon as “cheapest cost avoider” (“CCA”), Judge Wiley reasoned
that “[w]hen efforts to minimize accident costs are relatively inexpensive and
apt to be effective, courts impose tort duties,” and, because “Amazon has costeffective options for minimizing accident costs,” “Amazon therefore has a duty
in strict liability to the buyers from its site.”4
Loomis is a window into “the deep structure of modern tort law” and an
opportunity to reflect upon how—and why—CCA reasoning permeates judicial
decisions in products liability cases, especially those addressing novel risks at
the cutting edge of the regulatory state. What emerges is a richer conception of
the CCA rationale that transcends the conventional view (at least in the
academy) that relegates or cabins its influence to the domain of economic
efficiency interests. Consideration of liability for online platforms as CCA
reveals the mechanism by which courts’ decision to impose liability on new
entities derives from the regulatory needs of society, and hence the desire to pin
responsibility on entities in the best position to have readily avoided harm arising
from the imposition of excessive risks.5 To be sure, there are normative
dimensions to the determination of what is “cheap” and “costly” that reflect the
ever-changing tastes and values in society, and existing torts—themselves
derived from pressing regulatory needs in society—dramatically influences the
evolution of these normative views insofar as they influence what society deems
1. 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021).
2. Id. at 787 (Wiley, J., concurring). See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Modern Tort Law: Preventing
Harms, Not Recognizing Wrongs, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1423 (2021) (reviewing JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG &
BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020)) (“The deterrence-driven ‘cheapest cost avoider’ theory
drove the development and expansion of products liability. It remains a powerful driving theory for modern tort
cases that tackle torts at the cutting edge of the regulatory state and address widespread societal harms.”)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Modern Tort Law].
3. Loomis, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 787 (Wiley, J., concurring).
4. Id.
5. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Holding Amazon Liable as a Seller of Defective Goods: A Convergence of
Cultural and Economic Perspectives, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 339, 356 (2020) (“Perhaps the convergence
of cultural and economic perspectives is a distinct feature of modern torts, where given the culture and politics
of American law in 2020, a culturally specific norm incorporating power dynamics is efficiency-asresponsibility, meaning that the party with greatest control over a risk must pay for damages in the event of
harm.”) [hereinafter Sharkey, Holding Amazon Liable].
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costly or harmful.6 The evolution of products liability in the digital age as a
means of addressing dangers posed by the online platform economy reflects this
public-private interplay: products liability expands in light of what society
decides should be deterred and how (the public side), and such expansion is
inextricably linked to private individuals’ ability to bring causes of action to
redress harms inflicted (the private side).
Part I traces distinct stages of the evolution of products liability in the
United States, culminating in the arrival of the fifth (and current) stage of
products liability in the digital age: the advent of the online platform economy.
This historical sketch highlights how the deterrence-driven CCA theory
facilitated the development and expansion of products liability in response to
new societal risks. Part II recognizes that the challenge going forward is to refine
and apply the CCA framework in novel areas of tort law. For instance, courts
might acknowledge the primacy of the CCA framework but differ as to its
application in particular cases, e.g., is the “cheapest cost avoider” of product
harms arising in e-commerce the buyer, third-party party vendor, or online
platforms? Part II further unpacks the factors underpinning Judge Wiley’s
ultimate conclusion that “there is no doubt about Amazon’s ability to control the
distribution system Amazon invented. Amazon is the distribution system. It thus
should be strictly liable for defective products people buy from its site[,]”7 and
since “Amazon . . . completely controls its river[,] [t]here is nothing socially
irrational or ineffectively redundant about making Amazon strictly liable for
accidents from products bought from its website.”8
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Liability for harms arising from the use of products was historically limited
to the realm of contract, further restrained by a strict privity requirement that
restricted recovery to parties in a direct relationship.9 Thus, the buyer could sue
the seller, but not the remote manufacturer, of a defective product.10 This privity
limitation served as a formidable barrier to recovery, leaving a relatively small
domain for private enforcement of product injuries in what I shall term stage one
of the development of products liability. In the ensuing years, transformative
changes in society paved the way for dramatic shifts in products liability.

6. See generally Guido Calabresi & Spencer Smith, On Tort Law’s Dualisms, 135 HARV. L. REV. F. 184
(2022).
7. Loomis, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 792 (Wiley, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 793–94 (Wiley, J., concurring).
9. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 667 (12th ed.
2020) (situating privity limitation within first of four stages in history of U.S. products liability law).
10. See id. (“Courts often held that the ‘privity’ limitation prevented the injured party—whether consumer,
user, or bystander—from suing the ‘remote’ supplier of the product in question, that is, one who has no direct
contractual relationship with the injured party. Instead an injured consumer or user could sue only the immediate
vendor of the product; an injured bystander could sue only the party in possession of the product just before the
injury occurred.”).
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The automobile portended the first dramatic shift, ushering in stage two.
As the automobile replaced the horse-and-buggy, drivers and pedestrians faced
increased risks to life and limb on an entirely new scale. Soon the pressure was
too much for the privity limitation to bear. In the seminal MacPherson v. Buick
case,11 Judge Benjamin Cardozo acknowledged that the heightened risk
individuals in society faced from the automobile, which had emerged as a “thing
of danger,”12 necessitated a transformative shift in liability—namely the fall of
privity.13 As Cardozo famously opined: “Precedents drawn from the days of
travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel to-day. The principle that
the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the
principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing
civilization require them to be.”14 The privity limitation, whereby recovery was
limited to those in a direct contractual relationship with one another, no longer
made sense with the advent of the automobile. Indeed, the one entity that did not
need the protection of the law from the risks posed by the automobile would
seem to be the retailer in direct privity with the manufacturer—who would
almost surely not be the one to use the car and face its risks.15
Mass production of consumer goods ushered in the third stage of products
liability. In a pioneering concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola,16 Justice Roger
Traynor set the scene, highlighting how mass production had transformed the
way in which consumers purchased products: “As handicrafts have been
replaced by mass production with its great markets and transportation facilities,
the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a product has been
altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily
either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public.”17 The liability
framework that ensured the safety of handicrafts sold from individual seller to
buyer no longer sufficed to protect consumers who faced new hazards from
mass-produced goods bought from mass retailers: “The manufacturer’s
obligation to the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship
between them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of a product has
become so complicated as to require one or more intermediaries.”18 It took two
decades for the seed planted by Justice Traynor to flourish into a new form of
strict products liability. First, in California in 1965 with Greenman v. Yuba
11. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
12. Id. at 1053.
13. See id. (“We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences
of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation
where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.”).
14. Id.
15. See id. (“The dealer was indeed the one person of whom it might be said with some approach to
certainty that by him the car would not be used. Yet the defendant would have us say that he was the one person
whom it was under a legal duty to protect. The law does not lead us to so inconsequent a conclusion.”).
16. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
17. Id. at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
18. Id.
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Prods.,19 then propagating throughout the country via the newly minted
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A,20 strict liability displaced negligence as
the foundation for a new liability framework to protect consumers from the
hazards of mass-produced goods. Especially in an age where mass advertising
promoted mass-produced goods, as between hapless consumers and mass
producers of products, the manufacturers emerged as the cheapest cost
avoiders.21
Stage four saw a gradual expansion of the strict products liability
framework from manufacturing defects—the primary target of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A—to the ever-widening spheres of design defect and
failure to warn.22 Indeed, the decades from the mid-1960s to mid-1990s
witnessed an extraordinary expansion of strict products liability. As these
categories of injuries dramatically expanded, courts responded to enlarge the
domain of products liability but also to tweak the underlying liability framework,
introducing negligence-inflected risk-utility tests to cover design and warningsbased claims.23 In 1998, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
attempted a further curtailing of expansive strict products liability by
introducing a more restrictive formulation of a risk-utility test, the reasonable
alternative design requirement, for design defects.24 By and large, this more
restrictive standard did not catch on; nonetheless, the late 1990s into the dawn
of the 21st century was characterized by stasis more than expansion of traditional
products liability.
We have now arrived at a fifth stage as products liability confronts the
digital age, typified by a transformative shift away from in-person purchase
19. 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (holding “[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being.”).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (providing that manufacturing
defects are governed by strict liability).
21. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 443–44 (Traynor, J., concurring) (“The consumer no longer has means or skill
enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package,
and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by
advertising and marketing devices such as trademarks. Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept
them on faith . . . . Certainly there is greater reason to impose liability on the manufacturer than on the retailer
who is but a conduit of a product that he is not himself able to test.”) (citations omitted).
22. See EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 9, at 668 (“The fourth and present stage of products liability law
began in the decade following the 1965 Restatement with a series of important decisions in ‘defective design’
and ‘failure to warn’ cases, as they are now commonly known. These cases, which somewhat ironically have
expanded liability within the negligence framework, form the centerpiece of modern products liability law.”).
23. See generally Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (advancing “consumer expectations
test” (product defective in design if it failed to perform as safely as ordinary consumer would expect when used
in intended or reasonably foreseeable manner) and “risk-utility test” (product defective in design if benefits of
the challenged design do not outweigh risk of danger inherent in such design).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (“A
product . . . is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe[.]”).
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transactions at brick-and-mortar stores toward digital purchases on e-commerce
platforms.25 The epochal rise of the online storefront has vastly expanded the
volume of direct-to-consumer sales,26 implicating a panoply of potential harms
to consumers27 and raising the question of whether liability rules should be
changed, especially in light of the development of international e-commerce and
cross-border sales.28 Moreover, the rapid acceleration of online commerce not
only dramatically shifts consumers’ expectations regarding the ready
availability of a wide array of consumer goods, but also coincides with a
technological and information revolution that affords new possibilities for
product oversight and safety.29 At the same time, the newly-emergent, yet
rapidly growing and expanding platform economy has created opportunities for
new business models to evade traditional products liability frameworks that have
yet to catch up.
Two key insights emerge from this thematic grouping of the stages of
products liability from the late 19th century to the present. First, products
liability is a microcosm of how the common law evolves over time, specifically

25. See Sharkey, Holding Amazon Liable, supra note 5, at 340 (“Amazon’s meteoric growth and
expansion—accelerated by the global COVID-19 pandemic—signals the revolutionary transformation away
from brick-and-mortar physical stores to the virtual marketplace.”) (footnote omitted).
26. See, e.g., Juozas Kaziukėnas, The Decade of Chinese Factories Selling Directly to the World,
MARKETPLACE PULSE (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.marketplacepulse.com/articles/the-decade-of-chinesefactories-selling-directly-to-the-world (“[Chinese] factories that previously produced products for retail giants
like Walmart realized that e-commerce platforms allowed them to reach consumers directly. . . . Although by
removing intermediaries, Amazon lost many of the checks in the supply chain created by them. Amazon wasn’t
the only platform that allowed that, but its Fulfillment by Amazon (FBA) created a shopping experience that
eliminated long delivery times often associated with buying from China.”); Global B2C E-commerce Market to
Witness Substantial Growth Between 2021-2028 Expanding at a CAGR of 9.7%, BUS. WIRE (Dec. 3, 2021),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20211203005417/en/Global-B2C-E-commerce-Market-to-WitnessSubstantial-Growth-Between-2021-2028-Expanding-at-a-CAGR-of-9.7---ResearchAndMarkets.com
(“The
global B2C e-commerce market size is anticipated to reach USD 7.65 trillion by 2028. . . . Online goods and
service providers offer various options to their customers, such as vast product portfolio, discounted price rates,
convenient payment methods, same-day delivery, and easy return policies while purchasing any goods or
services, resulting in growing customer preference toward e-commerce platforms.”).
27. See The Benefits and Risks of Direct-to-Consumer Strategies in Manufacturing, LIBERTY MUT. INS.
(Mar. 29, 2019), https://business.libertymutual.com/insights/the-benefits-and-risks-of-direct-to-consumerstrategies-in-manufacturing (“Selling directly to consumers introducers new exposures to the manufacturer that
wholesalers or retailers may typically take responsibility for as part of third-party contractual agreements. For
example, this could include new product liability risks related to labeling and shipping or cyber and general
liability risks that come with running an e-commerce store.”).
28. To date, scholars have wrestled with the tensions posed by regulating goods produced for a national
market via state products liability laws, which can differ quite significantly across states. See, e.g., Samuel
Issacharoff & Catherine Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006) (touching on this
theme). Such tensions are exacerbated in light of the borderless nature of e-commerce.
29. See Product Safety and Compliance in Our Store, AMAZON (Aug. 23, 2019),
https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/product-safety-and-compliance-in-our-store (“Every few
minutes, our tools review the hundreds of millions of products, scan the more than five billion attempted daily
changes to product detail pages, and analyze the tens of millions of customer reviews that are submitted weekly
for signs of a concern and investigate accordingly. Our tools use natural language processing and machine
learning, which means new information is fed into our tools daily so they can learn and constantly get better at
proactively blocking suspicious products.”).
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to respond to new societal risks—posed by the automobile, mass-produced
goods, and now, digital e-commerce. Second, a deterrence-based, prevention of
harms or CCA justification for doctrinal shifts is a continuous thread, an
enduring principle that can be traced back to MacPherson and carried through
to today.30 At each juncture in the development of products liability law, judges
relied explicitly on deterrence rationales to address new forms of risks and
prevent them from materializing into harms, and in doing so, recognized new
harms and/or expanded tort liability.
II. ONLINE PLATFORMS AS “CHEAPEST COST AVOIDERS”
Strict products liability has evolved in light of new risks presented by an
increasingly complex and mechanized society and to address new business
models designed to shield entities from liability.31 Historically, CCA applied to
“sellers” of a manufacturer’s products, because it was the sellers who, through
their ongoing relationship with the manufacturers and through contribution and
indemnification in litigation, combined with their role in placing the product in
the consumer’s hands, were in the best position to pressure the manufacturers to
create safer products. The question then arises: what about the fifth stage,
namely the transformative shift in the digital age to e-commerce platforms? How
does one apply the principles underlying strict liability to product harms
emanating from the platform economy?
Seen in this light, the conventional targeting of “sellers”—and the
accompanying definition of a seller as one who transfers legal title of a product
or good—was a convenient proxy for the CCA in the extant brick-and-mortar
store economy. But, holding fast to the centrality of transfer of legal title to the
definition of “seller,” even as the transformation in delivery of products takes
place and the technical potential for wide-scale post-market monitoring of goods
opens up, is reminiscent of courts’ rigid adherence to the privity requirement,
even as the transformative force of the automobile and then mass-produced
goods forever reshaped the products liability landscape.
The CCA framework instead would switch focus away from transfer of
legal title and countenance a broader definition of “seller” (or “distributor”) that
tags responsibility upon the party best able to ensure product safety. In the words
of the Bolger court, drawing specifically on precedents that extended
manufacturer strict liability to retailers: “Amazon, . . . like conventional
retailers, ‘may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may

30. See Sharkey, Modern Tort Law, supra note 2, at 1436–40 (demonstrating centrality of cheapest-costavoider analysis in seminal modern products liability cases).
31. Cf. Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 605 (2020) (“Strict products liability was
created judicially because of the economic and social need for the protection of consumers in an increasingly
complex and mechanized society, and because of the limitations in the negligence and warranty remedies.”).
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be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer’s
strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety.’”32
A. WHY APPLY THE CCA FRAMEWORK?
In the brick-and-mortar economy of goods, defining “seller”
formalistically as transferor of legal title served as a suitable proxy for CCA. But
with the platform economy revolution of the digital age it no longer does;
moreover, the circumvention principle has led to a new form of e-commerce
business model designed specifically to evade legal responsibility for dangerous
products, leading to externalized product safety risks onto the public. It is thus
time to revert to the underlying CCA framework—the principles of which have
guided the evolution of products liability throughout successive stages—to
search for new answers.
1. The Anachronistic Hold of Legal Title
Early cases addressing the liability of an online platform (in each case thus
far, Amazon) hewed to traditional conventional definition of “seller” as one who
transfers legal title of a good to the buyer. Thus, in Eberhart v. Amazon.com,
Inc.,33 the New York federal district court held that Amazon fell outside the
“distribution chain,” and as such, could not be held liable as a distributor under
state strict products liability law.34 According to the court, legal title is the sine
qua non of liability: “regardless of what attributes are necessary to place an
entity within the chain of distribution, the failure to take title to a product places
that entity on the outside.”35 Not only did the court hew to the traditional hold
of “legal title,” it emphatically rejected the CCA framework for deciding the
issue, noting that, in numerous prior situations, the court had “explicitly rejected
the proposition that strict liability may be imposed on an entity that merely
facilitat[es] the distribution of a defective product simply because that entity is
in the best position to exert pressure on the product’s manufacturer.”36

32. Id. at 617 (quoting Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964)). Vandermark
was the seminal case applying strict products liability to nonmanufacturing retailers (and distributors). As Mark
Geistfeld elaborates, the rule of strict products liability for retailers is entirely premised on a deterrence rationale:
[A]n upstream supplier or the manufacturer can be insolvent or otherwise not subject to
indemnity liability, leaving a downstream seller without recourse [via an indemnity action shifting
responsibility to the manufacturer]. That prospect, however, gives sellers an incentive to deal with
financially sound suppliers and manufacturers that contractually obligate themselves to provide
indemnification for the seller’s tort liabilities. And to the extent that a seller is still concerned about
its exposure to liability, it has an incentive to engage in independent product testing, a practice that
has been adopted by large domestic retailers of products manufactured by foreign firms.
MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 330 (3d ed. 2020).
33. 325 F. Supp. 3d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
34. Id. at 397, 400.
35. Id. at 398.
36. Id. at 399 (internal quotations omitted).
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A subsequent New York federal district court doubled down on this
reasoning in Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc.37 On
“nearly identical facts” to those in Eberhart,38 the court rejected the argument
that “Amazon was at the top of the chain of distribution and was in the best
position to further the public policy considerations underlying the doctrine of
strict products liability.”39 To begin, the court reasoned that “[g]iven that
Amazon d[id] not know who the manufacturer is, it [was] not in a position to
influence it.”40 But it also seized the opportunity to cast doubt on the CCA
framework, remarking that “just because a party might have the ability to exert
pressure on a manufacturer does not mean that it is necessarily best placed to do
so.”41
Notwithstanding the degree of control Amazon exerted over the purchase
of the goods—including, in each case, storing the goods as part of its warehouse
inventory pursuant to the “Fulfilled by Amazon” program—the fact that
Amazon never took title to the products in question was determinative to these
New York federal courts’ rejection of strict products liability.42 This outdated
definition of seller/distributor, moreover, is reified in some state products
liability statutes.43
But e-commerce companies can (and have) readily (and profitably) exploit
this formalistic definition of seller tied to transfer of legal title by designing a
business model for a platform middleman who conveys title from a third-party
vendor to end-user, otherwise acting much in the way of a traditional seller or
distributor of goods. Indeed, given the ease with which goods can be listed,
distributed, or sold via an online platform that steadfastly resists accepting legal
title, circumvention of legal liability was not only to be expected, but perhaps
37. 425 F. Supp. 3d 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
38. Id. at 163. According to the court, the facts of the case were on all fours with Eberhart: (1) “[t]he
plaintiff . . . purchased a product from a third-party vendor through Amazon.com[,]” and (2) “the third-party
vendor . . . participated in Amazon’s Fulfilment by Amazon service” so that “the same terms and
conditions . . . applied[.]” Id.
39. Id. at 164.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Moreover, these two federal cases influenced a recent New York state appellate court opinion. See
Wallace v. Tri-State Assembly, LLC, 201 A.D.3d 65, 68 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t. 2021) (“Central to both courts’
analyses was the undisputed fact that at no time did Amazon ever obtain title to the products in question and,
rather than being viewed as a distributor, Amazon is better characterized as a provider of services[.]”). The
plaintiffs raised warranty claims (and not strict products liability); nonetheless, the court’s reasoning went further
to embrace what it termed “the well-settled legal principle that liability may not be imposed for breach of
warranty or strict products liability upon a party that is outside the manufacturing, selling, or distribution
chain[,]” which includes Amazon, as Amazon “merely provided the website . . . used to purchase the [allegedly
defective product] from an independent third-party seller and have it assembled by an independent third-party
assembler.” Id. at 68–69 (emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., LA. R.S. § 9:2800.53(2) (defining “seller” as “a person or entity who is not a manufacturer
and who is in the business of conveying title to or possession of a product to another person or entity in exchange
for anything of value”); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 2-103(1)(d), 2-106 (defining a seller as a person who
sells or contracts to sell goods, and defining a sale as the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price);
810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-106 (defining a sale as the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price).
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even encouraged. Professors Edward Janger and Aaron Twerski go so far as to
argue that the early U.S. courts’ creation of an “Amazon exception to tort
law[]”44 is a result of Amazon.com consciously “hid[ing] its true role from
consumers.”45
2. “Cheapest Cost Avoider”
At the core of the CCA framework are factors that signify an entity’s
knowledge of relevant risks and degree of control over such risks sufficient to
prevent harms arising from them. With regard to product safety, inspection and
monitoring of the product (ideally over time) in order to learn of existing or
emerging dangerous propensities is key. An added dimension is the capacity, on
the basis of such examination or investigation into product safety risks, to
influence the manufacture, design, or warnings of the product. In this way, the
entity’s role or involvement ensures against risks and incentivizes safety with
the ultimate goal of preventing injuries arising from the product.
The CCA framework, and its prevention of harm imperative, sheds light on
the evolution of “seller” to extend its doctrinal reach to consignors but stop short
of auctioneers.46 A consigner (even without accepting legal title) is wellpositioned to pass upon the quality of the products within its ken, whereas an
auctioneer, with “impromptu” contact with the goods, is not.47 Nor does an
auctioneer have the kind of continuous relationship with producers as do
consignors such that they could influence the safety features of those products.48
The CCA will often have additional features which may be relevant to
courts’ identification of the CCA but are not strictly necessary or core to its
identification.49 First, contractual undertakings—specifically, providing

44. Edward J. Janger & Aaron D. Twerski, The Heavy Hand of Amazon: A Seller Not a Neutral Platform,
14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 259, 262 (2020).
45. Id. at 259.
46. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability extends strict products liability to “commercial
product lessors” and “a wide range of nonsale, nonlease transactions” in which title never passes. § 20 cmt.a.
But excludes transactions involving intermediaries such as “commercial auctioneers” or firms “engaged
exclusively in the financing of product sale or lease transactions.” Id. §20 & cmt.g.
47. See, e.g., Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279, 282 (Pa. 1989) (“[T]he auctioneer is not
equipped to pass upon the quality of the myriad of products he is called upon to auction and with which his
contact is impromptu.”).
48. Id. (“Nor does [the auctioneer] have direct impact upon the manufacture of the products he exposes to
bids, such as would result from continuous relationships with their producers and which would be expected to
provide him with influence over the latter in acting to make products safer.”).
49. But see Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-cv-03221-JST, 2019 WL 1259158, *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
19, 2019) (finding CCA necessary but insufficient to hold defendant outside vertical chain of distribution, relying
instead on three-factor “marketing enterprise doctrine” test: “(1) the defendant received a direct financial benefit
from its activities and from the sale of the product; (2) the defendant’s role was integral to the business enterprise
such that the defendant’s conduct was a necessary factor in bringing the product to the initial consumer market;
and (3) the defendant had control over, or a substantial ability to influence, the manufacturing or distribution
process.”). The Carpenter court held, however, that, “even assuming . . . that Amazon had a substantial ability
to influence the manufacturing or distribution process, . . . the Plaintiffs . . . failed to produce sufficient evidence
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on the second prong,” and, therefore, Amazon was properly granted
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warranties against product defects—might be a signal of a party’s willingness
and ability to control risks. Second, whether the entity takes physical possession
of the goods, or engages in moving, storing, labeling, packaging and/or shipping
them, could signal the level of control it exerts. Third, the amount of economic
benefit or financial gain from a product could warrant further investigation of its
business model, and knowledge and control factors. Fourth, the fact that the
entity is necessary to bring the final product to the relevant market might also be
a signal of its potential CCA status.
There are alternative grounds, apart from deterrence-based CCA, for
holding an entity liable under products liability.50 First, loss or risk spreading (as
distinct from loss or risk minimization) as a rationale would look to the entity’s
ability to raise prices to spread costs over its consumer base.51 Second, the
“consumer expectations” rationale attaches liability to entities that foster
consumer reliance through their involvement in the distribution and/or sale of a
product. Notwithstanding the comparative decline of the consumer expectations
rationale as the CCA deterrence rationale gained force, 52 the platform economy
“fifth stage” of products liability has perhaps ushered in a resurgence of this rival
(or complementary) rationale. As a California state court put it succinctly:
“Amazon customers have an expectation of safety—and Amazon specifically
encourages that expectation[.]”53 Online platforms (such as Amazon) can situate
themselves as the sole interlocutor between the third-party vendor and
consumer;54 from the consumer’s perspective, the platform provides the product
summary judgment notwithstanding whether it controlled or could substantially influence the defective product’s
manufacturing or distribution. Id. at *5.
50. Here, I pause to acknowledge (but not address further) the goal of compensation or providing recourse
to injured plaintiffs. I align myself with the view that, while it may be that third-party vendors may be defunct,
insolvent, or impossible to locate by the time of suit, just because Amazon is available to pay damages does not
mean that it should be held strictly liable. See Oberdorf v. Amazon, Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 164 (3d Cir. 2019)
(Scirica, J., dissenting in part) (“[A] seller may be defunct, insolvent, or impossible to locate by the time of
suit, . . . [b]ut . . . to assign liability for no reason other than the ability to pay damages is inconsistent with our
jurisprudence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. See id. at 144 (considering, as one of four factors, “[w]hether ‘[t]he [actor] can distribute the cost of
compensating for injuries resulting from defects by charging for it in his business, i.e., by adjustment of the
rental terms.’”) (quoting Musser, 562 A.2d at 282).
52. See, e.g., Clayton J. Masterman & Kip Viscusi, The Specific Consumer Expectations Test for Product
Defects, 95 INDIANA L.J. 183, 196–97 (2020) (“[C]ourts remain deeply divided over what test should be used to
evaluate products liability claims. Courts that switched to the risk-utility test generally did so because the
consumer expectations test proved unmanageable and flawed in practice, and because the risk-utility test more
clearly resembles the negligence test with which the courts are more familiar and comfortable.”). But see
GEISTFELD, supra note 32, at 74 (“[T]he risk-utility test only complements the consumer expectations test and
cannot completely substitute for it.”).
53. Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC., 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 618; see Product Safety and Compliance in Our
Store, supra note 29 (“[B]ecause of our direct relationships with customers, we are able to trace and directly
notify customers who purchased a particular product online and alert them to a potential safety issue—our
systems are far more effective than other online and offline retailers and customers can feel confident they’ll
have the information they need.”) (emphasis added).
54. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 144–45 (noting third-party vendors could communicate with customers only
through Amazon, enabling Amazon to conceal itself from the customer and, thereby, leave them with no direct
recourse).
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information (and may even be identified as the seller of some, if not all, goods
on the platform), processes payment, and deals with any returns or exchanges.
B. WHO IS THE CHEAPEST COST AVOIDER?
Courts might acknowledge primacy of the CCA framework for resolving
the issue of liability for e-commerce harms but nonetheless differ in applying
the framework as to who is the CCA: the buyer, third-party vendor, or online
platform?55
Oberdorf—a recent addition to the torts canon,56 announcing the arrival of
the “fifth” stage of products liability—was an inflection point in the United
States, signaling the turning of the tide away from earlier courts’ formalistic
reliance on transfer of title as the bright-line marker of a seller. Moreover, the
case’s journey from the federal district court (Oberdorf I57) to the court of
appeals (Oberdorf II58 and Oberdorf III, en banc59) to the state supreme court60
illustrates that, notwithstanding a shared dedication to the CCA framework and
prevention of harm as a primary goal, courts reach different conclusions with
regard to which entity/entities involved in e-commerce is/are in fact the cheapest
cost avoider(s).
To begin, the federal courts (hearing cases on diversity jurisdiction,
applying state law) agreed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had embraced
a CCA framework. Or, to be more precise, at least two of the four factors the
state court looked to in determining whether an actor was a “seller” resonate
strongly with the CCA framework: (1) whether “imposition of strict liability
upon the [actor] serves as an incentive to safety,” and (2) whether the actor is
“in a better position than the consumer to prevent the circulation of defective
products.”61
55. Moreover, this challenge arises more generally when courts face novel tort law issues. See Sharkey,
supra note 2, at 1423–24 (“When the U.S. Supreme Court faced a novel tort law issue in 2019 in Air & Liquid
Systems Corp. v. Devries — namely, whether the manufacturer of a ‘bare-metal’ product such as a turbine,
blower, or pump has a duty to warn of dangers that arise from the later incorporation of asbestos-laden parts into
the product — the Justices turned to first principles from tort theory. . . . [W]hile the majority and dissent
disagreed as to which party — the bare-metal product manufacturer or the subsequent parts manufacturer — was
in fact the cheapest cost avoider, they were unanimous in using the lens of law-and-economics, incentive-driven
tort theory.”); Id. at 1454 (“The challenge going forward is how to refine and apply the ‘cheapest cost avoider’
framework in novel areas of tort law.”).
56. See EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 9, at 706–13.
57. 295 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
58. 930 F.3d 136 (3d Cir., 2018).
59. 818 F. App’x. 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (certifying the question of whether Amazon is a “seller” under
Pennsylvania law to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
60. The case settled after oral argument before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court prior to answering the
question of whether Amazon is a “seller” under Pennsylvania law.
61. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 144 (quoting Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279, 282 (Pa. 1989)).
The other two factors are: “Whether the actor is the ‘only member of the marketing chain available to the injured
plaintiff for redress’”; and “Whether ‘[t]he [actor] can distribute the cost of compensating for injuries resulting
from defects by charging for it in his business, i.e., by adjustment of the rental terms.’” Id. The latter of these is
a “loss spreading” rationale. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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But then the federal courts leaned in opposite directions when applying the
framework to Amazon. The Oberdorf I lower court reasoned that Amazon
“cannot have any ‘direct impact upon the manufacture of the products’ sold by
the third-party vendors.”62 The court explained further that, “[b]ecause of the
enormous number of third-party vendors . . . Amazon is . . . ‘not equipped to
pass upon the quality of the myriad of products’ available on its Marketplace.”63
The Oberdorf II appeals court reversed course, applying the same framework
but concluding instead that Amazon was in fact the CCA.64 First, the court
reasoned, given that Amazon is able to remove unsafe products from its website,
imposing strict liability would incentivize it to do so.65 Second, according to the
court, Amazon’s website is the public-facing forum for products listed by thirdparty vendors and is in a unique position to receive reports of defective products,
whereas third-party vendors’ channels to communicate with customers are
limited by Amazon.66
At that point, the court of appeals, taking the case en banc in Oberdorf III,
and in a case of first impression, certified the case to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to decide, once and for all, how to apply its CCA framework to ecommerce. But alas, following oral argument in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, the parties settled—leaving the doctrinal issue unresolved.
The Oberdorf saga, then, presents a microcosm of the vexing issue of
applying the CCA framework in the context of liability for e-commerce product
harms: namely, who is the CCA—the buyer/consumer, the third-party vendor,
or the online platform (Amazon in this case)?
1. Buyer
Relatively little attention is given to the buyer or consumer as putative
CCA. Nonetheless, when placing an order with Amazon, buyers assent to
Amazon’s “Conditions of Use,” in which Amazon disclaims all warranties for
products sold by third-party sellers.67 Moreover, there is some judicial sentiment
that Amazon does not exercise, relative to the consumer, greater influence in the

62. Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 501 (quoting Musser, 562 A.2d at 282). On appeal in Oberdorf II, Judge
Scirica agreed. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 164–65 (Scirica, J., dissenting in part) (“Amazon Marketplace is ‘not
in the business’ of choosing, monitoring, or influencing the third-party sellers’ products or manufacturing
processes.”). Moreover, Judge Scirica added, “Amazon Marketplace does not exercise, relative to the consumer,
any greater “influence in the manufacture of safer products[,]” and so should not be forced to adopt “a
fundamentally new business model simply because it could.” See id.
63. Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 501 (quoting Musser, 562 A.2d at 282). As a result, the Oberdorf I court
concluded, Amazon “cannot be liable . . . under a strict products liability theory.” Id.
64. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 144 (noting “Musser is a significant case to which we look for guidance,” but it
“does not command the result that Amazon seeks”).
65. Id. at 145–46.
66. Id. at 146–47.
67. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com Inc., 407 F. Supp. 3d 848, 851 (D. Ariz. 2019)
(“Amazon’s conditions of use plainly state that Amazon does not warrant the offerings of any third-party
vendor.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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manufacture of safer products, and so should not be forced to adopt a
fundamentally new business model simply because it can.68
But the reality is, even if Amazon is not the CCA vis-à-vis the consumer,
attention would turn next to the third-party vendor. Products liability has moved
beyond the days when privity reigned supreme and disclaimers of liability
cemented the consumer/buyer as CCA. Moreover, given the fundamental shifts
in the consumer marketplace and power dynamics of e-commerce, which only
exacerbate the informational asymmetries, the Amazon consumer seems
especially ill-suited to bear liability.69 The third-party vendor emerges as another
more feasible candidate (relative to the ultimate consumer) besides the online
platform to consider as CCA.
2. Third-Party Vendor
Numerous courts (including Oberdorf I) applying the CCA framework (in
whole or in part) have identified the third-party vendor as the most realistic
target for liability. It is worth unpacking the reasoning behind such decisions.
In one such case, a federal district court in New Jersey affirmed the central
“principle[] of . . . allocating the risk of loss to the party better able to control
the risk[.]”70 But the court rejected Amazon as CCA on the ground that it
“lack[ed] control over the product at issue, making it, ultimately, unable to
manage the risks posed by the allegedly defective product.”71 The court
proffered three primary reasons. First, the court looked simply to the fact that
Amazon did not contract with the manufacturer of the allegedly defective
product.72 Second, while Amazon did contract with the third-party vendor
through the Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement, the court
downplayed its significance, finding that it “relate[d] mainly to the relationship
between the two parties, not to Amazon’s control over [the third-party vendor’s]
product.”73 Third, the Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement did not
“grant Amazon the discretion to raise prices; so, unlike a manufacturer or seller,
Amazon would not be able to recapture the expense of an occasional defective
product by an increase in the cost of the product.”74
But none of these reasons address the core features of knowledge and
control over the relevant risks. First, privity is no longer a requisite element for
68. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 164–65 (Scirica, J., dissenting in part).
69. See Sharkey, Holding Amazon Liable, supra note 5, at 346–48.
70. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-cv-2738-FLW-LHG, 2018 WL 3546197, at *11
(D.N.J. July 24, 2018).
71. Id. (granting Amazon’s motion for summary judgment as to claims of products liability against it under
a state product liability statute).
72. See id. (“[N]o contract exists between Amazon and the manufacturer; in fact, Amazon admits it does
not know the manufacturer’s identity. Thus, lacking a contractual relationship with the manufacturer or supplier,
Amazon was not in a position to exert pressure to ensure the safety of the product[.]”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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products liability (the court’s first rationale); nor is loss spreading (the third
rationale) a primary driver of the CCA framework. The Allstate court’s ipse
dixit—namely that, because it lacked a contractual relationship with either the
manufacturer or supplier, “Amazon was not in a position to exert pressure to
ensure the safety of the product”75—is conceptually similar to courts that toe the
formalistic title line, but even less convincing in that it reasserts the bygone
privity limitation as the dividing line.
Still, other courts have embraced CCA as a key component of their analysis
of whether strict liability should extend beyond the distributive chain of a
traditional seller, taking into account these key knowledge and control factors,
but still finding that Amazon is not CCA.76 For example, an Illinois federal
district court was not persuaded that “[t]he facts that Amazon had the right to
require third-party sellers to meet certain safety requirements in order to list their
products on the marketplace . . . and that Amazon stopped allowing third-party
sellers to list [the product] on the marketplace . . . unless they showed proof of
compliance with safety standards” sufficed to target Amazon as the CCA.
Notwithstanding the evidence that Amazon could in fact exercise control, the
court ruled that such evidence “d[id] not establish that Amazon was in a position
to eliminate the unsafe character of the product,” reasoning that liability would
go too far given that “Amazon cannot be expected to judge the quality of every
product for sale by third parties.” 77
A federal district court in Arizona (again, sympathetic to the overarching
CCA framework78) elaborated on this rationale. First, it insisted that “[e]ven
after receiving products from third-party vendors, Amazon still exercises only
minimal control over those products such that it has little meaningful ability to

75. Id. at *11.
76. See Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 3d 766 (N.D. Ill. 2019). In order to determine whether
strict liability should be extended beyond the distributive chain of a traditional “seller,” the court relied on a
three-prong test that asked whether an entity: “(1) participated in the manufacture, marketing and distribution of
an unsafe product, (2) derived economic benefit from placing the unsafe product in the stream of commerce, and
(3) [been] in a position to eliminate the unsafe character of the product and prevent the loss.” Id. at 779. The
court reasoned that, although (2) cut against Amazon, (1) and (3) (the CCA factor) cut in favor of it. See id. at
779–80. The court ultimately granted Amazon’s motion for summary judgment as to claims of strict products
liability against it under state law. See id. at 782.
77. Id. at 779–80 (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 926 F.3d 295, 304–
05 (6th Cir. 2019) (finding Amazon capable of spurring production of safer goods based on (1) its restrictive
contracts with third-party vendors, (2) its attempts to require third-party vendors to submit compliance
documentation for potentially dangerous products, and (3) its ban on certain dangerous products from being sold
on its marketplace).
78. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 3d. 848 (2019). In order to
determine “if entities participate significantly in the stream of commerce and are therefore subject to strict
liability,” the court looked to many factors, including whether they: (1) provide a warranty for the product’s
quality; (2) are responsible for the product during transit; (3) exercise enough control over the product to inspect
or examine it; (4) take title or ownership over the product; (5) derive an economic benefit from the transaction;
(6) have the capacity to influence a product’s design and manufacture; or (7) foster consumer reliance through
their involvement.” Id. at 851. I take CCA framework to be reflected primarily in (3) and (6).
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inspect them.”79 Moreover, Amazon lacks “the time and technical know-how
needed to inspect, detect, and ultimately remove dangerous defects from the
products it is in the business of selling before placing them in the stream of
commerce that the typical manufacturer or seller does.”80 Second, the court
reasoned that, at most, Amazon can wield “indirect” pressure regarding
manufacturing processes or design choices.81 “Specifically, Amazon does not
have a unilateral ability to force any vendor or manufacturer to adopt any
particular design or manufacturing method.”82 Moreover, even though “its
marketplace may provide a great opportunity for such businesses, those
businesses remain free to sell their wares through other channels.”83
One striking feature (to be addressed further below) is the abundance of
federal courts (sitting in diversity) deciding this issue of first impression. But
there are also a couple of state court decisions following suit and resisting
designating Amazon the CCA. A Texas State Supreme Court Justice, concurring
in the majority’s rejection of liability for Amazon based on an interpretation of
“seller” contained in the state products liability statute, 84 reasoned that “the law
should not treat those that play only an incidental role in a product’s placement
as sellers, because they are rarely in a position to deter future injuries by
changing a product’s design or warnings.”85 And the Ohio Supreme Court,
likewise resting its decision on an interpretation of “seller” contained in its
products liability statute, nonetheless signaled its hostility to finding Amazon
the CCA, maintaining that the third-party vendor (“like the consignee”) “may
bear the risk for actually placing the product into the stream of commerce,” but
given “Amazon’s peripheral role in relation to the distributive chain of the
[allegedly defective product]” it was not “in a position to ensure against risks or
to incentivize safety.”86
While these decisions do seem to confront, head-on, the key control factors
(albeit against the backdrop of specific language in state products liability
79. Id. at 852.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 853–54 (Although . . . Amazon can influence third-party vendors in some ways, it wields no
more than indirect pressure over their design choices or manufacturing processes.”).
82. Id. at 854.
83. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, describing the lower court’s
analysis as “neither a novel approach to the law nor overly rigid . . . [and] entirely consistent with existing
Arizona case law.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 835 F. App’x 213, 216 (9th Cir. 2020).
84. The Texas Products Liability Act defines a “seller” as “a person who is engaged in the business of
distributing or otherwise placing, for any commercial purpose, in the stream of commerce for use or consumption
a product or any component part thereof.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.001(3).
85. Amazon.com, Inc. v. McMillan, 625 S.W.3d 101, 116 (Tex. 2021) (Boyd, J., dissenting).
86. Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 120 N.E.3d 885, 892 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) aff’d 164 N.E. 3d 394, 399400 (Ohio 2020) (“[The appellant] points to various factors to argue that Amazon controls all aspects of sales
by third-party vendors. According to [the appellant], Amazon prevents sellers from contacting customers; retains
sole discretion to determine the content, appearance, and design of its website; reserves the right to alter the
content of product descriptions; and imposes restrictions on pricing. While these factors may demonstrate the
degree of control that Amazon seeks to exert in its relationship with sellers, they do not establish that Amazon
exercised control over the product itself sufficient to make it a ‘supplier’ under the Act.”).
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statutes), they characterize Amazon’s role as “incidental” or “peripheral”
without much elaboration of the underlying empirical facts. We turn next to a
pair of California state court decisions that include the most extensive discussion
to date of these underlying facts, which tend to establish the requisite level of
knowledge and control over the relevant products risks.
3. Online Platform
What sets the California state court decisions, Bolger and Loomis, apart is
the extent to which each delves into the empirical facts underlying a CCA
analysis (against the backdrop of essentially common law, as opposed to
statutory, products liability standards).87 The Bolger court set forth a number of
Amazon’s “current efforts” (detailed below) that demonstrate its “capacity to
exert its influence on third party sellers to enhance product safety.”88 In so doing,
it delivers the theoretical notion of CCA—which might be indeterminate as
between third-party vendor and online platform—to the doorstep of practical,
empirical reality, as concerns Amazon. And, in the eyes of Judge Wiley,
concurring in Loomis, given the facts relating to “Amazon’s position in the
distribution chain [that] allows it to take cost-effective steps to reduce
accidents,” it is “not a close call” to impose liability on Amazon given that “the
benefits of the actions Amazon can take to minimize accidents vastly outweigh
the costs of these actions to Amazon.”89
Online platforms in the e-commerce economy have the capacity to situate
themselves as a novel form of gatekeeper between third-party suppliers and
customers:90 “[j]ust as a conventional retailer, Amazon can use its power as a
gatekeeper between an upstream supplier and the consumer to exert pressure on
those upstream suppliers . . . to enhance safety.”91 Just as a conventional retailer
can exert pressure on manufacturers with whom it is not in contract, so too the
online platform can exert indirect pressure on manufacturers through the parties
with whom it does have ongoing relationships, namely the third-party vendors.92
87. Bolger is also significant as it stands as the first state appellate court decision holding Amazon strictly
liable.
88. Bolger v. Amazon.com, Inc., 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).
89. Loomis v. Amazon.com, Inc., 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021).
90. For example, following reports on the prevalence of review fraud on Amazon’s platform, Amazon said
it permanently banned over 600 Chinese brands across 3,000 seller accounts it suspected of violating its policies.
See Sean Hollister, Amazon Says It’s Permanently Banned 600 Chinese Brands for Review Fraud, THE VERGE
(Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.theverge.com/2021/9/17/22680269/amazon-ban-chinese-brands-review-abusefraud-policy. Similarly, following a media investigation into over 4,000 items on Amazon’s platform that had
“been declared unsafe by federal agencies,” two thousand of which “were missing standard health-risk warning
labels,” Amazon made changes to or outright removed thousands of listings. Ben Gilbert, Amazon Was Caught
Selling Thousands of Items That Have Been Declared Unsafe by Federal Agencies, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 23,
2019, 7:33 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-selling-unsafe-items-third-party-sellers-report2019-8.
91. Loomis, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 784 (quoting Bolger, 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 618).
92. See Bolger, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 623 (“[E]ven assuming that it is true in some cases, Amazon is incorrect
that a direct relationship with a manufacturer is necessary to promote product safety[,]” as “Amazon, like a
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Online platforms can take various steps to proactively affect product
safety.93 At the outset of a platform’s relationship with third-party vendors, its
initial listing contract can require safety certification, indemnification, and
insurance as prerequisites to listing third-party vendors’ products. At the
contracting stage, for example, Amazon’s “Amazon Services Business Solutions
Agreement” imposes numerous restrictions on a third-party vendor’s ability to
sell products on its platform.94 It requires third-party vendors to comply with all
applicable laws and regulations.95
Nor does the online platform’s proactive ability to influence product safety
stop at the time of the initial contracting with the third-party vendor. It can
continue to monitor for safety issues and remove dangerous products.96 For
example, Amazon has a Product Safety Team that monitors customer reviews
and other data sources to identify product safety issues, regardless of whether
the product was sold by Amazon or by a third-party vendor.97 Moreover,
Amazon deploys sophisticated machine learning technologies as part of a
“robust and active process to monitor, track, and log consumer complaints.”98
Specifically, Amazon touts:
Every few minutes, our tools review the hundreds of millions of
products, scan the more than five billion attempted daily changes to
product detail pages, and analyze the tens of millions of customer
reviews that are submitted weekly for signs of a concern and
conventional retailer, can exert pressure on manufacturers indirectly through the parties with whom it does have
ongoing relationships, i.e., third party sellers.”); see Loomis, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 781 (“Amazon had substantial
ability to influence the manufacturing or distribution process through its ability to require safety certification,
indemnification, and insurance before it agrees to list any product. . . . Amazon’s contention that it has no
relationship with the manufacturer or the distributors has no bearing on whether it can influence the
manufacturing process.”).
93. As in Bolger, the Loomis court determined that there were “steps, which Amazon ha[d] taken to ensure
product safety in limited circumstances[] [that] refute[d] its contention that it ha[d] no ability to proactively
affect product safety.” Loomis, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 784.
94. See Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 926 F.3d 295, 304–05 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting BSA “imposed various
restrictions on [the third-party vendor’s] ability to sell products on [Amazon’s] marketplace.”).
95. Amazon retains “power to demand proof of . . . compliance [with all applicable laws and regulations],
or of additional certifications, before a third-party seller may offer products for sale.” Thus, once potential
product dangers come to light, Amazon can, at that point, require third-party vendors to submit compliance
documentation. See Fox, 926 F.3d at 305 (“Defendant attempted to demand safety compliance documentation
from third-party hoverboard sellers following initial reports of hoverboard fires and explosions.”).
96. Loomis, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 784 (“With the rights retained, Amazon could halt the placement of
defective products in the stream of commerce, deterring future injuries.”).
97. See About Product Safety at Amazon, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=202074030 (last visited July 1, 2022) (“The Product Safety Team at Amazon works to
protect Amazon customers from risks of injury associated with products offered on Amazon by looking into and
taking action on reported safety complaints and incidents.”). Elsewhere on its website, similar but slightly
different descriptions of the Product Safety Team’s activities are given elsewhere on Amazon’s website. See
Product Safety and Recalls, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=
GLD7VXFKV4AWU78X (last visited July 1, 2022) (“Our Product Safety Team investigates and acts on
reported safety complaints and incidents to protect customers from risks of injury related to products sold on
Amazon.com.”) (emphasis added).
98. Bolger, 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 617 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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investigate accordingly. Our tools use natural language processing and
machine learning, which means new information is fed into our tools
daily so they can learn and constantly get better at proactively blocking
suspicious products.99
Thus, on an ongoing basis, it analyzes such complaints and determines whether
to continue to allow any product to be listed on Amazon.100 If and when an issue
is identified, Amazon may remove a product from its marketplace and/or
suspend the third-party vendor.101
As Judge Wiley concluded: Amazon is “in a better position than its
customers to learn of and to combat defects in products on its website.”102
“Amazon is situated swiftly to learn of and to contain [any] emerging problem,
thereby reducing accidental injuries[,]” e.g., “Amazon can cabin the danger by
stopping sales[,]” “Amazon can alert past buyers who have yet to experience the
lurking hazard[,]” and “Amazon has information about its customers and their
purchases.”103
C. WHO SHOULD DECIDE?
1. Courts (State or Federal)
There is an interesting dynamic between federal and state courts with
regard to emerging issues of first impression. Oberdorf is part of a trend of
increasing federalization of products liability issues.104 And yet, simultaneously
there is a recognition that it is the purview of the highest state supreme court to
set forth the governing standard. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Third
99. See Product Safety and Compliance in Our Store, supra note 29.
Myriad issues are raised by Amazon’s deployment of machine learning/AI—including the extent to which
it adheres to principles of “trustworthy AI,” as well as whether there is an appropriate mechanism whereby
affected parties can challenge its automated determinations. See generally National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Trustworthy and Responsible AI, NIST, https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/trustworthy-andresponsible-ai (last visited July 1, 2022).
100. Bolger, 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 617 (“[Amazon] analyzes these complaints and determines whether to
continue allowing a product to be offered for sale on Amazon.”).
101. See id. at 618 (“If Amazon is unsatisfied with a third party seller’s response, or if its products turn out
to be defective, Amazon has the power to suspend sales of certain products or block a third party seller from
offering products for sale.”). See Fox, 926 F.3d at 305 (“Defendant eventually ceased all hoverboard sales on its
marketplace worldwide.”).
102. Loomis v. Amazon.com, Inc., 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (Wiley, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 786 (Wiley, J., concurring).
104. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, A Quiet Revolution in the Work of the Federal Courts: The New
Federal Common Law of Torts, 19 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCIENCE (forthcoming 2023). A similar observation
from the trenches:
Lawyers filing these cases should be aware that Amazon will remove any case it can to federal court.
Astute readers may notice all the cases cited above are in federal district court. That’s no accident.
Amazon has made clear its preference to have any personal injury or product liability case against it
heard in federal court if possible.
Casey Gerry, Personal Injury and Product Liability Claims Continue to Pile up for Amazon, E-COM. LIAB. (Mar.
9, 2022), https://www.ecommerceliability.com/personal-injury-and-product-liability-claims-continue-to-pileup-for-amazon.
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Circuit, sitting en banc in Oberdorf III, certified the issue to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to decide the issue of first impression as a matter of state law.105
And the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit likewise certified the issue to the
Texas Supreme Court.106 Strategic considerations, however, may keep states
from deciding the issue on a state-by-state basis.
Consider the conundrum facing Judge Diana Motz who sat on a three-judge
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Erie Ins. Co. v.
Amazon.com, Inc.107 The majority upheld the lower federal court’s
determination that Amazon was not liable as a “seller” under the state’s Uniform
Commercial Code for defective products.108 Judge Motz believed that, although
state law supported the result, the state law was outmoded. Moreover, it was the
specific prerogative of the state supreme court to respond to changing societal
risks by reforming or expanding the common law of products liability:
Maryland’s highest court has repeatedly emphasized that considerations of
public policy may justify a change in the common law when, in light of
changed conditions or increased knowledge, the former rule has become
unsound in the circumstances of modern life.109

And Judge Motz suggested the ways in which Amazon’s “outsized role” in
transactions on its platform presented a strong case for revisiting traditional
products liability.110 But the federal court nonetheless decided the case (without
certifying the question to the Maryland Court of Appeals) and resisted deeming
Amazon a “seller” based upon the outdated definition ensconced in statutory law
(a decision the Maryland legislature has not revisited).
2. Legislature(s)
Perhaps the most formidable barrier to the CCA framework arises not in
principle but due to institutional choice, namely reflexive deference to
legislatures, no matter how outdated the statutory language at issue. In Fox v.
Amazon.com, Inc.,111 the Tennessee federal district court conceded Amazon’s
CCA status—“holding Amazon liable as a seller supports the policy . . . [of]
promoting safety in the products sold to the public, and . . . placing the burden
of loss on businesses like Amazon, rather than those who are injured by the
products sold on its website”—but nonetheless insisted that this was a choice for
the state legislature, as such result would require “an expansion of the Act’s
105. See 818 F. App’x. 138 (3d Cir. 2020).
106. See McMillan v. Amazon.com, 983 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 2020).
107. 925 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 2019).
108. Id. at 144.
109. Id. at 145 (Mott, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 144–45 (Mott, J., concurring) (noting, e.g., “purchaser[s] of . . . allegedly defective
[products] . . . order[ing] . . . product[s] from Amazon’s website and pa[ying] Amazon directly[,]” “Amazon
t[aking] physical possession of . . . product[s], warehous[ing] [them], packag[ing] [them], and deliver[ing]
[them] to . . . carrier[s][,]” “Amazon . . . assum[ing] the risk of credit card fraud, receiv[ing] payment, and
remit[ing] a portion of that payment to . . . manufacturer[s][,]” etc.).
111. No. 3:16–cv–03013, 2018 WL 2431628 (M.D. Tenn, 2018).
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current definition of ‘seller.’”112 Nor was the court willing to expansively
interpret the “spirit” (or underlying CCA rationale) of the statute’s text.113 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed both that the “primary purpose behind the
doctrine of products liability” was “the capability to spur the manufacturing and
sale of safer products in the future,” but that, nonetheless, its hands were tied by
the statutory language.114
While this institutional debate—the extent to which state courts (or federal
courts interpreting state law) can adapt and expand the common law or should
defer to legislative action—plays out in many realms, it has particular force
given the rapid technological changes that have enabled the arrival of the “fifth
stage” of products liability in the digital age. Indeed, not to put too fine a point
on this, an Ohio State Supreme Court Justice lamented that “the divide between
the pre-internet age and the current age is so profound that laws like this [product
liability] Act might as well have been written in the stone age.”115
That said—and while more generally one might fear inertia especially in
such a rapidly developing area—there has been some state legislative activity
originating in California. A proposed California consumer protection bill
entitled “Product liability: electronic retail marketplaces,” would have
“require[d] an electronic retail marketplace[] . . . to be held strictly
liable[] . . . for all damages caused by defective products placed into the stream
of commerce to the same extent as a retailer.”116 And a subsequent proposed bill
would, “in any strict products liability action, make an electronic place that, by
contract or other arrangement with one or more third parties, engages in
specified acts strictly liable for all damages proximately caused by a defective
product that is purchased or sold through the electronic place to the same extent
as a retailer would be liable for selling the defective product in the retailer’s
physical store, regardless of whether the electronic place ever takes physical
possession of, or title to, the defective product.”117 These bills died in committee

112. Id. at *8. The Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978 provides that “[a] manufacturer or seller of a
product shall . . . be liable for any injury to a person or property caused by the product [if] the product is
determined to be in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of the
manufacturer or seller[,]” defining a “seller” as “any individual or entity engaged in the business of selling a
product, whether such sale is for resale, or for use or consumption.” TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-28-105, 29-28102.
113. See id. at *8 n.4 (“To the extent Plaintiffs suggest the Court apply the spirit of the law rather than the
actual text, the Court declines to do so.”).
114. See Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 926 F.3d 295, 304 (6th Cir., 2019).
115. Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 164 N.E. 3d 394, 403 (Ohio 2020) (Donnelly, J., concurring in judgment
only). Ohio’s Products Liability Act defines a “supplier” as “either . . . [a] person that, in the course of a business
conducted for the purpose, sells, distributes, leases, prepares, blends, packages, labels, or otherwise participates
in the placing of a product in the stream of commerce[]” or “[a] person that, in the course of a business conducted
for the purpose, installs, repairs, or maintains any aspect of a product that allegedly causes harm.” Id. at 398. In
Stiner, the court focused on whether Amazon “otherwise participate[d] in [] placing [the] product in the stream
of commerce[]” sufficient to be a “supplier” within the Act’s meaning. Id.
116. Assemb. B. 3262, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
117. Assemb. B. 1182, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021).
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and—in the aftermath of Bolger and Loomis—have not been re-introduced,
although they may serve as models for other state (or even federal) legislation.
3. Regulator(s)
Finally—whereas the most significant institutional choice in products
liability is typically between courts and legislatures—in this specific realm, the
Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) has also taken a fairly novel
(and aggressive) approach by filing an administrative enforcement action against
Amazon under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).118 Prior to the filing
of this complaint, Amazon had proposed to the CPSC a product safety pledge
similar to those in Australia and the European Union, which “call on online
marketplaces to execute recalls for products sold in their online stores by third
party sellers.”119 The CPSC instead took action in order to force Amazon to
“accept responsibility for recalling potentially hazardous products sold on
Amazon.com” by “charging that . . . specific products are defective and pose a
risk of serious injury or death to consumers and that Amazon is legally
responsible to recall them.”120
On January 19, 2022, an administrative law judge determined that Amazon
is a “distributor” that “distributes [consumer products] in commerce” as defined
in the CPSA,121 and that, as such, it is subject to regulation by the agency.
Specifically, with regard to “Fulfilled by Amazon” (FBA) products, Amazon
meets the definition of “distributor” given that it “(1) stores the merchants’
products at its facilities, (2) retrieves them from its inventory of Program
merchants’ products, (3) places the products in shipping containers, and (4)
delivers them directly to consumers by Amazon delivery vehicles or by carriers
with whom Amazon contracts.”122 The administrative law judge rejected
118. In the Matter of Amazon.com, Inc., CPSC Docket No.: 21-2 (2021).
119. See Letter from Carletta Ooton, Vice Pres., Prod. Assuranec, Risk & Sec., Amazon to Acting Chairman
Robert S. Adler & Comm’rs Elliot F. Kaye, Dana Baiocco & Peter A. Feldman (May 7, 2021),
https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/CPSC%20Letter%20to%20Commissioners%20Signed.pdf.
120. Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, CPSC Sues Amazon to Force Recall of
Hazardous Products Sold on Amazon.com (July 14, 2021), https://www.cpsc.gov/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2021/CPSC-Sues-Amazon-to-Force-Recall-of-Hazardous-Products-Sold-on-Amazon-com. In that
same press release, Robert Adler, the Acting Chairman of the CPSC, emphasized the necessity of “grappl[ing]
with how to deal with these massive third-party platforms more efficiently, and how best to protect the American
consumers who rely on them.” Id.
121. Per 15 U.S.C.S. § 2052(a)(8), “[t]he term ‘distributor’ means a person to whom a consumer product is
delivered or sold for purposes of distribution in commerce, except that such term does not include a manufacturer
or retailer of such product.” Per 15 U.S.C.S. § 2052(a)(7), “[t]he terms ‘to distribute in commerce’ and
‘distribution in commerce’ mean to sell in commerce, to introduce or deliver for introduction into commerce, or
to hold for sale or distribution after introduction into commerce.”
122. See Order on Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Decision at 7-8, In the Matter of
Amazon.com, Inc., CPSC Docket No.21-2 (Jan. 19, 2022); see also id. at 11 (“Along with receiving, holding,
and transporting consumer products—things a third-party logistics provider can do without becoming a
distributor—Amazon operates a website that brings merchants who want to sell consumer goods together with
consumers who want to buy those goods. And after a consumer purchases a Program product, Amazon provides
round-the-clock customer service and processes all returns for Program products. Consumers return products to
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Amazon’s idea that “taking title to a product is necessary to being the product’s
distributor.”123 Nor did the judge accept Amazon’s analogizing itself to “the
operator of physical shopping mall.” “While both a mall and Amazon.com
provide a venue that brings customers and merchants together,” the judge
mused, “that’s where the comparison ends.” What distinguished Amazon
emerged as central to its meeting the definition of a distributor:
Mall operators do not generally provide customer service as to
products bought from stores in the mall. They also don’t process
returns or decide whether a customer will receive a refund,
adjustment, or replacement. And because mall operators do not
process returns, they cannot mandate reimbursements from stores.124
While, as a formal matter, the CPSC decision only governs Amazon’s status as
a “distributor” under the federal Consumer Product Safety Act, its reasoning
might take on added significance as a kind of “federal common law” newly
emergent as part of the increasing trend of federalization of products liability
law, noted above.

CONCLUSION: ALIGNING INGENUITY WITH EFFICIENT CUSTOMER SAFETY
We may have reached a new inflection point—for Amazon, and for the
online platform economy. Amazon has publicly pledged new safety initiatives.
On August 10, 2021, it announced it would pay customers up to $1,000 for
damages or personal injury caused by products sold by third-party-vendors on
its website.125 When the California state legislature seemed poised to enact a bill
holding electronic retail marketplaces subject to strict liability, Amazon
signalled its support—provided that it apply to each of its competitors.126 And
on February 15, 2022, responding to the CPSC action, Amazon remarked: “We
are aware of the judge’s latest ruling in this case,” and “while we continue to
disagree with the notion that we are a distributor, we share CPSC’s commitment
to customer and product safety and will continue working toward that goal[.]”127

Amazon, not the Program-participating seller. On receiving a returned product, Amazon, not the seller, decides
whether the product can be resold.”).
123. Id. at 8. The judge also rejected Amazon’s claim countered that it was entitled to safe harbor protection
as a logistics provider because it “solely receives, holds, or otherwise transports a consumer product in the
ordinary course of business but who does not take title to the product[,]” 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(16).
124. Order on Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Decision, supra note 122, at 27.
125. See Jay Peters, Amazon Will Pay Up to $1,000 in Damages Caused by Defective Products, THE VERGE
(Aug. 10, 2021, 2:01 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/10/22618418/amazon-pay-property-damagepersonal-injury-claims-insurance.
126. See Amazon Stands Ready to Support AB 3262 If All Stores Are Held to the Same Standards, AMAZON
(Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/policy-news-views/amazon-stands-ready-to-support-ab3262-if-all-stores-are-held-to-the-same-standards (“We share the California legislature’s goal of keeping
consumers safe. To further that goal, this legislation aimed at protecting consumers should apply equally to all
stores, including all online marketplaces.”).
127. Martina Barash, Amazon’s New Distributor Status Means Safety ‘Headaches’ Ahead, BLOOMBERG L.,
(Feb. 15, 2022, 6:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/product-liability-and-toxics-law/amazons-newdistributor-status-means-safety-headache-ahead.
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Courts are increasingly inclined to apply a CCA framework, reasoning that
imposing products liability on Amazon “creates financial incentives that back
up Amazon’s good words about its concern for customer safety.”128 In the words
of Judge Wiley, “[t]ort law will inspire Amazon to align its ingenuity with
efficient customer safety” and “[o]nce Amazon is convinced it will be holding
the bag on these accidents, this motivation will prompt it to engineer effective
ways to minimize these accident costs” with the result that “[c]ustomers will
benefit.”129

128. Loomis v. Amazon.com, Inc., 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (Wiley, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 786.
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